Intelligence and Security Committee Report - May 2009

My comments are in red. The full report can be downloaded here. Read my brief summary of the report here. The ISC detailed timeline of MI5 and police contact with Mohammed Siddique KHAN and Shazad TANWEER can be found here.

Page 4 - Footnote

The Head of MI5 (known as the Director General) explained: “one of the things that has dogged us is that we have not known exactly [what happened when] we gave some of the [earlier] evidence... As we have dug back more and… put pieces together, [so] I think we have got a better understanding now… than we did [either] in the period shortly after the event [or] when you took some of the first evidence… As I said, it is unsatisfactory for you, as it is unsatisfactory for us, that even in the last week or two there have been additional references to Mohammed Siddique KHAN… which we did not know until last week and which had not in fact reached our records…” (19 June 2007).

Why has it taken so long for the intelligence services to analyse their information? One would have assumed it was a priority to pull together all the prior knowledge about the men immediately after the attacks, but this latest report proves that information related to the men has been sat quietly on MI5 databases for years.

Page 15 - 16

How were the bombers identified?
–
7 July, 22:19 – “Hasib HUSSAIN” reported as a missing person by his family.
–
7 July, 23:40 –Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) message refers to articles found at Aldgate bearing the names “Mr Sidique KHAN” and “Mr S TANWEER”.
–
8 July, 19:50 – MPS message refers to a Barclaycard found at Edgware Road bearing the name “Mr M S KHAN”.
–
9 July, a.m. – MPS message refers to checks on the articles found at Aldgate. A membership card is confirmed as belonging to “Shazhad TANWEER” of 49 Colwyn Road, Leeds. “Mohammed Sidique KHAN” of 11 Gregory Street, Batley, West Yorkshire is identified as the holder of an HSBC credit card and a Halifax current account card.
–
9 July, a.m. – Checks on intelligence databases find that the name “Mohammed Sidique KHAN” had appeared during Operation CREVICE. The MPS begin liaison with West Yorkshire Police.
–
9 July, 23:59 – Message created that collates the inquiries into the items found at Aldgate and Edgware Road and provides details on the cardholders.
–
10 July, 07:19 – A number of items of property in the name of “Hasib HUSSAIN” are recovered from Tavistock Square. This information is linked to the missing persons report.
–
10 July – Pathologist reports suggest that the men later identified as HUSSAIN, KHAN and LINDSAY were in possession of, or in close proximity to, the bombs at the times of the explosions.
–
11 July, 09:00 – Intelligence is received giving Mohammed Sidique KHAN’s current address as 69 Lees Holm, Dewsbury. KHAN’s car is seen parked outside this address.
–
11 July – Hasib HUSSAIN’s family tell the police that he had travelled to London on 6 July with a number of friends including Mohammed Siddique KHAN and Shazad TANWEER.
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11 July – Pathologist report suggests that the man later identified as TANWEER was in possession of the bomb at the time of the explosion.
–
11 July – KHAN, TANWEER and HUSSAIN become key suspects and the police apply for warrants to search associated addresses and vehicles.

How were the bombers identified? (continued)
–
12 July, 13:00 – KHAN, TANWEER and HUSSAIN are identified from CCTV at King’s Cross.
–
12 July – Checks of CCTV from Luton railway station point to the involvement of Jermaine LINDSAY. He becomes a key suspect.
–
13 July – Wife of Jermaine LINDSAY reports her husband missing and that he knew the occupants of the address in Lees Holm which she had seen being searched.
–
13, 15, 16 July – DNA analysis confirms that TANWEER had died at Aldgate, HUSSAIN at Tavistock Square, LINDSAY at Russell Square and KHAN at Edgware Road.

If we assume the men blew up then this implies that the identification was not on the men's person - where was it all then? Surely driving licenses and credit cards would have been quickly picked up by commuters. There is nothing to explain the details of the identification recovery and DNA analysis.

Page 16

41.
Our initial report said that MI5 had “come across two members of the 7 July group before on the peripheries of other investigations”. These two people were Mohammed Siddique KHAN and Shazad TANWEER. We were told about these connections when conducting our original inquiry (although we could not mention them), but in the new investigation we have gone back to source records and started afresh. Some of the information we now have was only discovered as a result of this new investigation and some we have revisited in even greater detail.

Why do the ISC act as if the public should be grateful for this new investigation? Almost two years had passed before they even began, and then it took them over a year to come up with a report that essentially reveals nothing new, but a bunch of jargon. I find it outrageous that this report is being heralded as proof that there is no need for an independent public inquiry.

Page 16

42.
In this inquiry, for the first time, we have brought together all the key events related to CREVICE and the 7/7 bombers. It has proved difficult and time consuming to draw this together as the information was provided piecemeal by a number of different organisations, some pieces of the story have changed as we have investigated them further, and during our inquiry some new information has emerged in relation to active MI5 and police investigations and operations. The detailed timeline of events is included at Annex A (page 57).

Almost four years after Britain's worst terrorist attack the public are permitted to read an edited report that is almost a year old. The ISC claim that they have conducted a thorough investigation. It's just not good enough - why should the public accept that it took over three years for them to join some dots together?

Page 17

46.
Then, in 2001, a group of 40 men were observed by West Yorkshire Police attending a training camp organised by two known extremists. Stills were produced from video footage of the camp and these pictures were shown to a number of sources, resulting in nine of the 40 men being identified at the time. (After 7/7, once it was confirmed that Mohammed Siddique KHAN was one of the bombers, the police went back through their files and found that one of the images, taken at this training camp, was of Mohammed Siddique KHAN. They had not been able to identify him in 2001.)

48.
Of these three events, only the training camp in 2001 was a significant lead. MI5 and the police attempted to pursue it at that time and sought to identify the men attending the camp, but they could identify only nine of them (Mohammed Siddique KHAN was not among these nine).

He was a British citizen holding a British passport - he had apparently been arrested in 1993 and he had worked with children - hence there would have been photos of him on public record. The notion that they could not identify him earlier from other photos is either phony or it implies negligence.

Page 17 - 18

51.
After 7/7, the police investigated a savings account belonging to Jermaine LINDSAY and discovered a telephone number which MI5 checked and matched with a number in their historical records.

In 2002, MI5 were investigating ***. During the investigation MI5 ran checks on a mobile telephone believed to be linked to the target and found that there was no registered owner – no further action was possible given the lack of any useful information.

After 7/7, once it was known that Jermaine LINDSAY was one of the bombers, the police investigated his savings account details and discovered a telephone number provided on the application to open the account.19 MI5 checked this telephone number against their historical records and discovered that it was the same number they had seen before in 2002.

Footnote 19: When LINDSAY applied to open an ISA account through the Britannia Building Society on 31 January 2004, he provided two telephone numbers on the application form. One of these numbers was for a mobile phone and this number was included on a list of numbers sent to MI5 in connection with the 7/7 investigation. LINDSAY’s girlfriend also provided the same number when reporting him missing.

This appears to be rather vague circumstantial evidence and how can the public verify or substantiate these apparent phone records?

Page  19

Telephone calls in July and August 2003 discovered, after 7/7, to involve Mohammed Siddique KHAN

13 July 2003
Data from a mobile phone associated with Mohammed Qayum KHAN (see paragraph 18) shows a number of calls with a telephone number MI5 had not seen before. Checks reveal that the telephone number in question is registered to “Siddique KHAN” of 49a Bude Road, Leeds (the address of a bookshop selling extremist literature). MI5 cannot match the name “Siddique KHAN” with any in their databases, and the contact is not investigated further since there is nothing to suggest involvement in any terrorist-related activity.

54.
What did MI5 do at the time? As standard practice, MI5 checked the telephone numbers of calls made and received by the phone associated with Mohammed Qayum KHAN. The call on 13 July 2003 is the only one where they found more information. They found that the telephone was registered to a “Siddique KHAN”. Whilst there was no guarantee that the person using the telephone was the registered keeper, MI5 nevertheless checked the name against their records. They did not find any further information. Given that there was no intelligence showing a connection with the facilitation network, no further action was taken. In line with standard procedure, a record of the call was added to the file of Mohammed Qayum KHAN’s telephone contacts.

55.
After 7/7, when the bombers had been identified, and MI5 were searching back through their records, they assessed that these four telephone calls were with Mohammed Siddique KHAN. At the time, however, there was nothing to indicate that these telephone calls were significant.

It seems unlikely to me that Khan would have had a mobile registered to the bookshop. Phone records alone are not evidence of anything criminal. Guilt cannot be assumed by association. The records were thought at the time to be insignificant and this report fails to fully explain why they are now put forward as significant.

Page 20

Meeting on 2 February 2004

2 February 2004
Surveillance of Omar KHYAM sees him parking his car in Crawley (with another occupant) and then a green Honda Civic (registration R480 CCA) with three occupants parking alongside. After two minutes the Honda (with two occupants later assessed by surveillance to be KHYAM and an unidentified male (UDM)) leaves and drives up and down the A2320 while the other three individuals remain in KHYAM’s parked car. There are no listening devices in either car, but surveillance believes that KHYAM and the UDM are driving around for the purpose of a meeting (although it is not known what is discussed). The men return to their original cars and both cars drive off. The Honda is followed to try and obtain some further information on the UDMs in case, at a later date, they are thought to be of interest and followed up on. At Toddington Service Station on the M1, the MI5 surveillance team secretly photograph the three UDMs in the Honda and classify them as UDMs C, D and E.21 The Honda continues its journey and two men alight at Lodge Lane and Tempest Road, Leeds. The car then drives towards Dewsbury and is seen to park outside 10 Thornhill Park Avenue.

57.
The reason MI5 were following KHYAM at this time was to discover as much as they could about the facilitation network. So when KHYAM met some new contacts, whom MI5 had not seen before, the surveillance team decided to follow them back to West Yorkshire to try and find out an address they could use for further investigation if necessary.22 The car registration was checked23 and the car was found to be registered to a “Hasina PATEL”24 at the same address in Dewsbury to which the car had been followed.

58.
At this time there was no evidence to indicate that the individual was not an innocent contact (not everyone KHYAM met could be assumed to be part of the facilitation network), but nevertheless MI5 asked West Yorkshire Police to check the name “Hasina PATEL” and the address (10 Thornhill Park Avenue, Dewsbury) against their databases in order “to enable us to fully identify any potential associates of KHYAM”. Nothing significant was found and, with no evidence to justify further action, none was taken.

Footnotes

21 After 7/7, these UDMs were formally identified: • UDM C is now known to be Shipon ULLAH (also known as Waheed ALI). • UDM D is now known to be Shazad TANWEER (one of the 7/7 bombers). • UDM E is now known to be Mohammed Siddique KHAN (the leader of the 7/7 bombers).
24 After 7/7, it was discovered that “Hasina PATEL” was Mohammed Siddique KHAN’s wife and that they had married in October 2001.

Why were the men only 'formally' identified after 7/7? Again if photos were taken it should have been easy to identify them, and with regard to finding out Patel was Khan's wife this would also have been easy to find out.

Page 21

60.
Over the next six weeks, monitoring of KHYAM and the rest of the CREVICE group showed them in contact with a large number of people – including over 4,000 telephone-based contacts. It is now known that two unidentified men out of these contacts were in fact Mohammed Siddique KHAN and Shazad TANWEER.

How could they possibly have been unidentified at this stage when we are told that photos were taken of them with Khyam, and the car they reportedly met him in was registered to Khan's wife?

Page 21

Meeting on 28 February 2004

28 February 2004
Intelligence coverage of Omar KHYAM *** a UDM. MI5 surveillance observe the Honda Civic seen on 2 February (R480 CCA) with UDMs C, D and E meeting KHYAM and Shujah MAHMOOD in a car park in Crawley at 08:56. They make a series of visits to builders’ merchants, travel to a mosque in Slough, and then stop for approximately 30 minutes at KHYAM’s address in Hencroft Street (*** ***). They then travel to Wellingborough (near Northampton), via Toddington Service Station near Luton (where they meet Mohammed Qayum KHAN at 17:30 hours), before returning to Slough to drop off KHYAM and MAHMOOD at 23:35 (nothing of significance was discussed in KHYAM’s car during the day). The MI5 surveillance team stay with KHYAM, but the Metropolitan Police Service surveillance team follow the remaining unidentified men back to West Yorkshire – again with the aim of finding something as a reference point should it be assessed that these men were suspicious and needed following up later. They stop again at Toddington Service Station, and at Castle Donington Service Station (near Derby), Tempest Road (Leeds), outside a church in Lodge Lane (Leeds), and finally park in Pickles Field, Batley (near Leeds). CCTV stills from Toddington Service Station are requested by the police, but there is no indication that these requests were received by MI5.

61.
On 28 February 2004, the three unidentified men (UDMs C, D and E) who had been seen meeting KHYAM on 2 February were seen meeting him again.25 There was nothing of interest discussed in KHYAM’s car and ******.

62.
When the unidentified men left KHYAM, the MI5 surveillance team stayed to monitor him overnight. But a separate Metropolitan Police Service surveillance team followed the UDMs back to West Yorkshire to try and link them with an address, to obtain a reference point to go back to should any follow-up action be needed.

I find it utterly implausible that these men had not been identified at this point if indeed these surveillance reports are genuine. It does appear that MI5 are attempting to shift blame onto the police for apparent blunders in surveillance sharing, but it is obvious MI5 could have gained access to the police reports.

Page 22

63. What did MI5 do next? MI5 checked the details of the Honda Civic again and this time it was found to be registered to a “Sidique KHAN”, living at a different address from the addresses in Leeds and Batley at which the car had previously been observed. MI5 and the police ran checks against their databases on the name and all the addresses, but no results were found. Because they had found various different spellings of the name, and there were no significant traces found, the police believed that it might be an alias.

 DVLA records would reveal who made this change and the marriage to Patel would have made it obvious which Khan it was.

Page 22

Meeting on 23 March 2004

23 March 2004
Further surveillance on KHYAM observes him and four UDMs travelling from Crawley to Slough. The individuals travel in KHYAM’s car and a green Vauxhall Corsa (YB52 LUF) with the words “Car Clinic” and a telephone number on the side. The surveillance team believe that the driver of the Corsa is identical to the driver of the Honda Civic on 28 February (UDM E). Another of the individuals is described as being identical to one of the passengers in the Honda Civic on 28 February (UDM D). During the afternoon, in KHYAM’s car, KHYAM and an unidentified male speak briefly about the “success of the Madrid bombings”. KHYAM and UDM E visit an internet café before returning to KHYAM’s flat. (***.) Eavesdropping at KHYAM’s flat in the evening hears that the men are from Leeds and the conversation is largely related to financial fraud. Video stills are produced from surveillance. The police later find that the Vauxhall Corsa is registered to Lombard Vehicle Management Ltd.

Page 23

66. In summary, when MI5 knew that KHYAM was an attack planner he was seen to meet UDMs D and E on two occasions. There was no intelligence to show whether the UDMs were suspicious or innocent until the final meeting when they were heard discussing financial fraud. This was sufficient for MI5 to run routine checks and exchange information on them with West Yorkshire Police and the Metropolitan Police Service. However, given that they were not discussing attack planning and did not pose a threat to life, they were not made priority targets.

What did MI5 do about these unidentified men they saw with KHYAM?

(i) Did they put the men under surveillance?

67. No. Mohammed Siddique KHAN (UDM E) and Shazad TANWEER (UDM D) were never themselves targets of MI5 surveillance.

So, the public is led to believe that Khan and Tanweer at this stage had not been identified even though they were reportedly discussing how successful the Madrid bombings had been with a high priority terrorist suspect. If this is believed then it certainly appears that someone was keeping these men from being identified. Who made the decision not to place them under MI5 surveillance, and is there more to the story than simply priority? In my opinion if the information in this report is true then it does give credence to the logical suggestions that Khan and perhaps Tanweer may have been working as informants.

Page 24

70. Both MI5 and the police therefore followed three unidentified men, one of whom we now know was Mohammed Siddique KHAN and another we now know to be Shazad TANWEER, after they were seen meeting the target of a surveillance operation. This did not mean that MI5 or the police had these UDMs “under surveillance”. It meant that they were “housing” them to obtain a lead to run checks on if necessary or to come back to if they needed to in the future.

If this is true then someone made the decision that they were not deemed to be a threat. The excuses about priorities, ie. 'essentials' and 'desirables' given in this report are inadequate and do not fit with intelligence standards.

Page 24

72. After the meeting on 2 February 2004, “level 1” checks were carried out which showed that the car was registered to a “Hasina PATEL” at 10 Thornhill Park Avenue, Dewsbury. MI5 then asked West Yorkshire Police for any details they had on a “Hasina PATEL” in order “to enable us to fully identify any potential associates of KHYAM”. No information was discovered.

Patel was married to Khan - marriage records are not big secrets and therefore surely this information was discoverable.

Page 25

73. After the meeting on 28 February 2004, when the car had been seen a second time, “level 2” checks of the car were carried out and it was found now to be registered to “Sidique KHAN”, who lived at 11 Gregory Street, Batley, near Leeds. His date of birth (obtained from his insurance policy, the details for which are supplied by the customer and not verified) was given as 20 October 1974. The car was linked to two previous addresses: 10 Thornhill Park Avenue, Dewsbury, and 99 Stratford Street, Leeds. These new details were then cross-checked against MI5 and police databases, but did not produce any significant results.

Why weren't these results significant?

74. From what was known about them after the two sightings, MI5 concluded that the UDMs did not merit resources being diverted to them (as opposed to other individuals who were known to be involved in attack planning). Nor did they meet the strict criteria for intensive surveillance. MI5 and the police did, however, run appropriate checks to try and ensure that there was nothing on record to suggest that the UDMs should be a higher priority.

(iii) So they did have details on Mohammed Siddique KHAN prior to 7/7?

75. Yes. Prior to 7/7, Mohammed Siddique KHAN’s name had appeared on a number of occasions in different versions, linked to different addresses, telephone numbers and vehicles, on various databases and in connection with separate incidents. We have collated these instances here, but at the time they were not connected.

Police and MI5 records relating to Mohammed Siddique KHAN

1. 3 February 1993: Record of caution for criminal assault and prisoner photograph – “Sidique KHAN”, DoB 20/10/74. (Information held on Police National Computer.)
2. April 2003: Checks on a car (BMW) seen with another person who was being followed show it registered to “Sidique KHAN”, 11 Gregory Street, Batley. (Information held by West Yorkshire Police (WYP) Special Branch.)
3. 13 July 2003: Telephone calls to and from a phone associated with the CREVICE facilitator. Telephone registered to “Sidique KHAN” of 49a Bude Road, Leeds. (Information held by MI5 on the record of the CREVICE facilitator.)
4. 16 February 2004: Checks on a car (Honda Civic) seen with KHYAM on 2 February show it registered to “Hasina PATEL”, 10 Thornhill Park Avenue, Dewsbury. (Information held by MI5, WYP and Metropolitan Police Service (MPS).)
5. 29 February 2004: Checks on a car (Honda Civic) seen with KHYAM on 28 February show it registered to a “Sidique KHAN”, 11 Gregory Street, Batley, DoB 20/10/74. Car also linked to 10 Thornhill Park Avenue, Dewsbury and 99 Stratford Street, Leeds. Checks on a storage facility at 99 Stratford Street registered to “Mohammed Sadique KHAN”. (Information held by MI5, WYP and MPS.)
6. 27 January 2005: Police statement taken in relation to a hire car (Vauxhall Corsa), seen with KHYAM (ten months earlier), registered to “Mr S. KHAN”, 10 Thornhill Park Avenue, Dewsbury. Various names, addresses and other details are checked, including a voter check on 11 Gregory Street, Batley which shows a “Mr Mohammed KHAN” residing. (Information held by MPS.)

In my opinion it should not have been that complicated to draw some connections from these records.

Page 26

78. With the resources and time to do so, MI5 could have connected the names, albeit without 100% certainty given the different spellings and addresses. (We note that West Yorkshire Police believed the name “Sidique KHAN” could have been an alias due to a combination of both the multiple spellings and lack of traces on databases.) However, the more important question is: what difference would it have made had MI5 connected these pieces of information?

79. MI5 have said that even if “S. KHAN” had been discovered to be the same individual appearing on each occasion, there was still nothing to indicate that he was involved in a plot to carry out terrorist attacks and therefore they would not have done any more to investigate him given what else was going on at the time.

If the police and security services could not even figure out one Khan from the other then how can they be certain about many of the records they presume relate to MSK.

Page 27

84. MI5 have told the Committee that they could easily have verified the information they had and formally identified who UDM E was, but there was no reason to take this formal step because of what they thought he was. There was nothing at the time to suggest that UDMs D or E were more than small-time fraudsters who had some minor contact with the CREVICE plotters. MI5 did not, therefore, verify the details they had on the men or open “personal files” for them. There was nothing, at the time, to suggest that MI5 should divert resources away from investigations of known terrorist plots in order to investigate someone whom they believed was a minor criminal.

So apparently because no further surveillance was authorized there was nothing at the time to suggest that Tanweer or Khan were more than small-time fraudsters who had some minor contact with the CREVICE plotters . I find it hard to believe that intelligence officers would not make the decision to follow up men who according to information in this report had more than minor contact with a recognised bomb plotter.

Page 28

88. So, on 23 March, MI5 had heard UDMs D and E talking to KHYAM, 34 but they did not mention the bomb plot. At no time during Operation CREVICE did MI5 obtain any intelligence that indicated that UDMs D and E were involved in attack planning. On this basis, they were not categorised as “essential” targets.

Surely rapport with a suspected terrorist deemed by MI5's priority system as ‘essential’ would warrant keeping tabs on Tanweer and/or Khan.

Page 32

But MI5 did hear Mohammed Siddique KHAN talking about operations in Pakistan – should that not have made him an “essential” target?

107. It was only after 7/7 that MI5 knew that KHYAM had described going over the Pakistan border to carry out an “operation” in a conversation with Mohammed Siddique KHAN (although it was actually KHYAM doing most of the talking). This conversation took place on the evening of 21 February 2004 and was picked up by an eavesdropping device in KHYAM’s car.

Why was this only discovered after 7/7? If Khan was merely on the receiving end of Khyam's operational chatter then what exactly is the significance of this conversation?

Page 34

110. Following the bombings on 7 July 2005 and the provisional identification of the bombers, the police searched their records to find that they previously had done research on Mohammed Siddique KHAN as part of Operation CREVICE. They therefore reviewed their surveillance and eavesdropping material and were able to identify that the UDM who had been recorded talking with KHYAM on 23 March 2004 was Mohammed Siddique KHAN. Further analysis and comparison of a number of sources of information during July and August 2005 revealed that Mohammed Siddique KHAN also featured in the recording of 21 February 2004.

What was discovered about this conversation after 7/7
In August 2005, as a result of further analysis of surveillance and eavesdropping material from CREVICE, the police were able to identify Mohammed Siddique KHAN’s voice in the recording from 21 February 2004. The Committee has seen a transcript dated 21 August 2005 which specified that the conversation involved “Asian male voices including Omar KHYAM and two originally unknown males, one with a northern English accent the other is identified as Mohammad Sidique KHAN”.
This fourth version of the transcript was formally completed to an evidential standard on 24 October 2005.
The assessment that Mohammed Siddique KHAN was involved in this conversation was confirmed ***, in the autumn of 2005, *** ***.

111. Therefore, only after 7/7, when the police had identified Mohammed Siddique KHAN as their main suspect and further investigated material from CREVICE, was it discovered that Mohammed Siddique KHAN had been in the car during this conversation on 21 February 2004.

So, it certainly appears that someone within MI5 managed to have MSK’s connection with the Crevice plotters kept a secret until after 7/7.

Page 37

123. It has become clear, since 7/7, that Mohammed Siddique KHAN had been training in Pakistan (on at least two occasions) and also possibly in Afghanistan.

The sourcing for evidence of training in Pakistan is not substantiated in this report and appears to be vague.

Page 38

131. In mid-July 2005, the detainee was shown unmarked press photographs of Mohammed Siddique KHAN and identified him as “IBRAHIM”. Following this, MI5 were able to ascertain *** that “ZUBAIR” was a man called Mohammed SHAKIL. Later in July, the detainee confirmed this identification when he recognised a photograph of SHAKIL as being “ZUBAIR”. *** ***.

Evidence gathered from prisoners does not in my opinion make anything clear, especially when MI5 are known to bribe and brutally torture detainees.

(ii) An extremist in Afghanistan in the late 1990s

132. Separately, in January 2005, West Yorkshire Police received information (***) that a man named “Saddique ***” and a man named “IMRAN” had undergone training in Afghanistan in the later 1990s and early 2000s. The intelligence indicated that both men were extremists.

“Saddique ***” in Afghanistan

17 January 2005
West Yorkshire Police Special Branch receive intelligence alleging that a man named “Saddique ***” and a man named “IMRAN” had undergone training in Afghanistan in the late 1990s/early 2000s. The information indicates that both men lived in Batley (“Saddique ***” in the Soothill area) and were committed to the extremist cause. West Yorkshire Police cross-check this information against their records with no result. The intelligence is shared with MI5 a few weeks later and they too check their records with no result.
1 March 2005
West Yorkshire Police Special Branch and MI5 both receive minor additional details, including that “Saddique ***” is in his early thirties and had reportedly received some military training in a mujahaddin camp in Pakistan in early 2001. This was the total of the relevant information received and it was not possible to corroborate it or investigate to find out more.
11 July 2005
Intelligence received after the bombings indicates that “Saddique ***” was in fact Mohammed Siddique KHAN.

What intelligence is this? And from what source? Given the admitted confusion with names, how can we be sure it really was MSK?

134. MI5 attempted to find out more about “IBRAHIM” and “Saddique ***”, but with very little information to go on, they had been unable to make much progress. There was no intelligence to link together “IBRAHIM”, “Saddique ***”, UDM E and Mohammed Siddique KHAN.

135. The Head of MI5 explained that, had the detainee identified “IBRAHIM” as Mohammed Siddique KHAN, they might have made him a higher investigative priority before July 2005. However, they would not necessarily have put significantly greater resources into pursuing him, given other investigative priorities:
 
In order to get on the “essentials” list you needed to be doing something which suggested you were involved in some form of life-threatening activity... We had not got to that point with Mohammed Siddique KHAN.

Where did these apparent intelligence tips come from? How was Khan travelling under aliases? What other evidence is there other than the opinion of a prisoner?

Page 48

174. As we have seen, in February and March 2004 (15 months before 7/7), Mohammed Siddique KHAN and Shazad TANWEER talked about financial fraud and conducting jihad in Pakistan. They were not talking about attacks in the UK. We now know from evidence uncovered after 7/7 that, in November 2004, Siddique KHAN made a home video in which he says goodbye to his daughter before departing for Pakistan (from where he did not expect to return).60 Therefore, eight months after CREVICE there still appeared to be no intention to conduct a suicide attack in the UK. Within a further eight months, however, KHAN and TANWEER had launched just such a suicide mission.

The video does not make clear what his intentions are and his words do not in my opinion imply that he would never return.

Page 68

227. On 7 July 2005, after the attacks took place, the Managing Director of a private crisis management company appeared on radio and television, stating that that same morning he had been in an office in London running a theoretical exercise with an unnamed company,76 evaluating how their crisis management procedures would respond to a bomb attack in London. He said that his fictional scenario included almost exactly the same stations where the bombs went off in real life. That the scenario closely resembled what actually happened, is not, as we have shown, that remarkable (this Managing Director also featured as a panellist on the Panorama programme mentioned above). However, that the exercise was taking place at roughly the same time that morning is indeed an astonishing coincidence. Unfortunately, his remarks were interpreted by some as direct evidence of a conspiracy. He himself has denied this, and we have not uncovered any evidence that this is anything other than a coincidence.

If Peter Power or other representatives of Visor Consultants had simply responded to the many reasonable requests for further information about the exercise on 7/7, then the suspicion, based largely on significant evidence of exercises being used as a cover for the 9/11 operation, would not have become rooted as proof of a conspiracy. Why did it take almost three years to establish this?

Page 74

Was there a fifth bomber or mastermind involved in 7/7?

253. It has been alleged in the media that there was a mastermind of the July bombings called Haroon Rashid ASWAT, and that he was linked to both the CREVICE fertiliser bomb plot and the 7/7 bombers. Mobile phone records are alleged to have confirmed that he was in contact with Mohammed Siddique KHAN hours before the London bombings.

254. After the bombings, MI5 investigated whether or not there was a “mastermind” who left the UK before the attacks. They found no intelligence to suggest that this was the case and no indication that ASWAT had any part to play in 7/7. There were some strands of intelligence, shortly after the bombings, which led MI5 to believe that ASWAT may have been involved in the attack, but these have since been discounted. Given that ASWAT and Mohammed Siddique KHAN lived in the same area of West Yorkshire, it is possible that they knew each other. ASWAT was detained in zambia on 20 July 2005 and deported to the UK on 7 August. On arrival, an extradition warrant requested by the Americans was served on him. He is currently awaiting possible extradition to the United States (he has gone through the domestic extradition process, and a ruling from the European Court of Human Rights on whether his extradition would be human rights compliant is expected in the summer of 2008).

255. *** ***.

Omitted Information pertaining to Aswat - why does this not surprise me?

256. It has also been alleged that ASWAT was protected from prosecution by Western intelligence services, and that he was able to leave the UK despite being on a terror watch list. We have found no evidence to substantiate these allegations.

There is no confirmation or denial here that Aswat was in touch with some of the men. Aswat has clearly been under investigation by intelligence services in a number of countries and the allegations he was protected by MI6 came from reputable sources and are based on facts.

The 'strands of intelligence' linking Aswat to the bombings, and the reasons for these strands being discounted, are not revealed and in my opinion warrant further investigation and disclosure.

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What is the connection with the extremist group Al Muhajiroun?

262. There is no evidence of any links between the London bombings and Al Muhajiroun.

263. ***. ***. Whilst membership or links with extremist groups might appear significant, it is not something that would, of itself, greatly influence the actions of MI5. Individuals who pose a threat are investigated irrespective of whether or not they belong to an extremist group (and irrespective of whether or not the group is banned).

How did they come to the conclusion that there are no links between the London bombings and Al Muhajiroun? The report does not comment on the numerous reports claiming the alleged bombers had met men known to be active members of Al Muhajiroun and of course gives no detail of the substantial evidence regarding MI5’s infiltration and manoeuvring of Al Muhajiroun.

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