The Coroner's Inquest: 2010

The hearing of 23 July confirmed that a forensic report has now been completed by the Metropolitan Police.

“The report covers matters such as the remains of the devices found at the four scenes, forensic evidence from Alexandra Grove and Chapeltown Road, the relevant cars, and the construction of the bombs.”

It was also revealed that CCTV material has been compiled to accompany the report that concerns the four men’s apparent travel to London on 7/7.

Given the many inconsistencies and discrepencies in the Home Office narrative it will be interesting to assess whether the new reports are in fact revised, or whether they have just regurgitated.

Approximately 220 witnesses have so far been selected as suitable candidates to give oral evidence. Hundreds of other witnesses including many of the survivors will not be called. The list of witnesses will be finalised mid September.

The criterion for the witness selection process has not been made clear. It was suggested that in order to streamline the inquest, multiple witness reports of the same incident should be whittled down.

It was remarked that witnesses that may, ‘not be directly relevant or controversial’ will not be called to give testimony.

It seems fair to point out that there will be a limited preordained selection of witnesses. There will be a lack of cross examination due to the decision not to have multiple witnesses giving different perspectives. And controversial witnesses will simply not be called.

It certainly appears that what the selected witnesses will say, is very much already on record, and one cannot help getting the impression that the witness testaments that will be given, will dovetail the Security Service, Police and emergency service reports that will have been prepared for the inquest.

The Security Service will not confirm whether all relevant documents will be made available, and have made it clear that they would prefer to release information only if it arises from the issues raised by witnesses or other reports.

The Security Service will of course be privy to all the information in the reports and witness accounts and are in an advantageous position; being that the inquest will not tackle the issues of preventability until after all the other issues have been heard.

Starting 11 October 2010 the inquest will hear evidence from four scene reports: Aldgate, Edgware Road, Kings Cross and then Tavistock Square. This is likely to take until February, at which point evidence from reports into the background of the four men, the forensics, pathology, explosions, command and control and emergency response will also be heard.

Given that the estimated hearing length has been given at 17-18 weeks, this schedule will leave little time to scrutinise the Security Service and Police forces on the issues of preventability. But this inquest was never going to be a full blown investigation and from all accounts it is clear that it will be much more an appraisal of the accepted events of the day than anything wider in scope.

The latest ISC report is still being ‘redacted’ and the Secretary of State is to become involved with the disclosure process. MI5, West Yorkshire Police and Metropolitan Police have all commented on the difficulties of the disclosure process.

Man hours, costs and also issues of sensitivity have been cited. It is claimed that due to time constraints only information deemed relevant to the issues raised in the inquest are to be released.

The Security Service also has the right to submit any information, even in the case that no one else will understand the relevancy or have access to the contextual information.

The Public Interest Immunity law is to be used to withhold the disclosure of any information that is assessed to be a risk to national security.

In conclusion it seems that the inquest is being stage-managed in a way that will result in barely any critical inquiry, no surprise witness revelations, a limited disclosure of new information relevant to the case against the four men and the wider investigation, and no thorough scrutiny of MI5 or the police with regards to preventability or involvement.

All of these limitations will no doubt be explained through the apparent constraints of time, money and national security.

Adrian Connock

14.08.10