Relatives for Justice
The experience of the bereaved and maimed of The Dublin and Monaghan Bombings by Don Mullan
In the aftermath of the multiple bombings of Dublin and Monaghan, Loyalist 'terrorist' groups were suspected. However, both the UVF and the UDA denied responsibility. Responsibility for the four car bombs was not claimed by any paramilitary group until 1993 when the UVF issued a statement saying that they, and only they, had carried out the bombings. This was in response to Yorkshire Television's 'First Tuesday' documentary which claimed the UVF were aided by the hidden hand of British Military Intelligence.
The Yorkshire Television claim is supported by several professional analysts, including a former Garda Commissioner and a former head of the British Army's EOD network, Lieutenant Colonel George Styles. All agree that given the level of sophistication, synchronisation and co-ordination required to carry out such a deadly operation, it is doubtful if the UVF would have had the capability in 1974 to mount such an attack without additional professional assistance.
The possibility of British Military Intelligence being involved in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings should not come as a surprise. 1974 was not the first time when Dublin was bombed for political purposes, resulting in the death of Irish citizens. On 1 December 1972, Dail Eireann was debating the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Bill, which proposed to secure a conviction of IRA membership on the sworn testimony of a garda superintendent. Defenders of civil liberties expressed deep disquiet about the Bill and the Fine Gael party was unhappy and unsure. The whole scenario was being closely monitored by Britain, anxious to see the legislation passed. Numbers, however, were pivotal. With Fine Gael wavering and Labour set to vote against, the Fianna Fail sponsored Bill seemed destined for defeat.
Shortly before the Bill was due to be debated, bombs exploded at Liberty Hall and Sackville Place, killing two CIE workers and injuring scores of civilians. As word reached the Dail Chambers it was assumed the IRA were responsible. Consequently, Fine Gael abstained and the Bill was carried by 69 votes to 22. Significantly, in August 1973, shortly after the trial of the Littlejohn brothers who claimed to be operating in the Republic of Ireland as British agents, Taoiseach Jack Lynch is reported to have said that both he and the Irish Cabinet had a 'suspicion' that the 1972 bombs had been the work of British Intelligence.
In the circumstances, neither the Government or An Garda Siochana can lightly dismiss the information presented by Yorkshire Television and later by RTE's Primetime documentary 'Friendly Forces', which establish strong arguments in support of the very real 'suspicion', if not probability, that British Military Intelligence were involved in the 1974 bombing of Dublin and Monaghan.
Captain Fred Holroyd
Former captain Fred Holroyd, an MI6 operative stationed in Portadown and army HQ in Lisburn has, since he was forced out of military service in 1975, caused more than a few headaches for his former political and military masters with his revelations of British 'dirty tricks' in Northern Ireland. When he left Ireland he was committed for a period to a military psychiatric hospital at Netley. This is a known tactic aimed at branding potential troublemakers as unstable and subsequently diminishing the value of what they might wish to say. Holroyd has stated publicly that he also believes Loyalists did not carry out the 1974 attack unaided. He describes Loyalist capabilities then as "pretty primitive".
In 1984 Holroyd dropped the Garda Siochana in the shit when he talked openly during a BBC Breakfast television interview about his undercover contacts with members of the Republic's police force. This prompted an initial internal Garda inquiry into Holroyd's allegations, headed by Chief Superintendent Dan Murphy. Murphy's inquiry failed to interview the former Military Intelligence Officer who had been attached to 3 Brigade, Portadown and who was also working to Craig Smellie, head of MI6 Northern Ireland. Murphy's findings were not made public.
Rumours began to circulate as to the identity of Holroyd's Garda contacts. The temperature began to rise in August 1986 when the Director of Irish Army Intelligence, Colonel Desmond Swan, presented a report to Garda Commissioner Laurence Wren detailing Garda links with British Army personnel. The report was based on Army intelligence files, one of which gave details of a visit to Dublin in 1974 by a serving detective Garda and a British Army officer, Major Peter Maynard.
On 20 January 1987 the Irish Independent carried an interview by journalist Brendan O'Brien with a serving detective garda whom British undercover had code named 'The Badger'. It was a scoop for O'Brien but a calculated decision by the garda detective who was clearly feeling the heat. In the interview the 'The Badger' gave tantalising details of his long established 'double' career. It began, he told O'Brien, in 1972 when a friend "with connections in Co. Armagh" told him a fellow in the North wanted to meet "some kind of policeman". He travelled to Lurgan were he met four plainclothed men, one of whom was Sergeant Bernard 'Bunny' Dearsley, a Field Intelligence NCO, who preceeded Holroyd and later acted as Holroyd intelligence assistant.
Dearsley clearly stated that they were British Army and wanted to exchange intelligence on 'terrorists'. 'The Badger' was to supply intelligence on the IRA/INLA and his British counterparts were to reciprocate with intelligence on Loyalist terrorists who might cause a threat to the Republic. Thus began a long running courtship between an officer of An Garda Siochana and British Military Intelligence.
On 3 May 1987 'The Badger' went public again, this time in the Sunday World. On this occasion his full identity was revealed. He was named as Detective Garda John McCoy, stationed at Monaghan Garda Station. In this interview with journalist Liam Clarke, the Badger went further, "claiming that he was only one of a string of gardai who did the same thing..." In an interview I conducted with Fred Holroyd at his Southend home on 15 December 1998, he told me that the Badger was "only the tip of the iceberg".
Sean Flynn, the Irish Times Security Correspondent, wrote on 18 May 1987, "In Garda circles, the interview is seen as a signal to more senior officers that Detective Garda McCoy may be prepared to disclose further details of Garda liaison with the British Army at that time, if any disciplinary action is taken against him."
McCoy's interviews must be seen in the context of two internal Garda inquiries conducted in the first half of 1987 into Holroyd's allegations. The first was lead by Detective Superintendent Hubert Reynolds and Detective Inspector Jack Hennessy, who completed their report in April. While this Inquiry did interview a former Garda Commissioner, Edmund Garvey, it did not interview serving officers above the rank of superintendent. Holroyd, who had stated his willingness to co-operate with the Reynolds/Hennessy investigation, was not interviewed. He was furious and says he complained to the Irish Ambassador in London, Noel Dorr. A third 'Holroyd Inquiry' was held in May 1987, under Chief Superintendent Tom Kelly.
Holroyd was secretly brought to Dublin by An Garda Siochana under a false name to testify at the new inquiry. He says he has retained the air ticket as proof. On Monday and Tuesday 11-12 May 1987, he gave a detailed statement to the Garda, which he says was taken, not by pen but by pencil. It ran into 30 pages, giving copious details of his and other British Intelligence officers dealings with several members of An Garda Siochana at various ranks. Holroyd says that the Garda failed to give him a copy of his statement before he left Dublin and have ignored his requests since.
There are serious implications in all of this for the Garda authorities, especially concerning their known contact with British Military Intelligence in the early 1970's. According to McCoy, the relationship established in 1972 between the Garda and British Army undercover was on the basis of shared intelligence. This, let us remember, was at a time which Taoiseach Jack Lynch publicly expressed his 'suspicion' that British Intelligence was involved in the 1972 bombing of Dublin. That bombing and the Taoiseach's remarks must have put McCoy and his superiors on guard concerning the quality of intelligence they were receiving.
Given the magnitude of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, how could British Army Intelligence, who knew all of the Loyalists suspects, fail to alert their Garda counterparts in advance? The answer to that question lies not in a can of worms but a snake pit.
Equally disturbing is the fact that McCoy accompanied a British Army bomb intelligence officer, Major Peter Maynard, to Dublin, three months after the Dublin and Monaghan bombs. Maynard, who was working to MI5, was attached to the British Army's 3 Brigade, Portadown, where all the loyalists, identified in Garda files, came from. Surely the Garda must have had serious questions by then about their intelligence sources.
Yet, the purpose of McCoy and Maynard's visit was to meet a serving Irish Army EOD Commandant, Patrick Trears, at his home in Castleknock. Trears informed me that he asked McCoy and Maynard if they were there with the knowledge of their superiors. Both said yes. At the meeting, during which McCoy absented himself for a period, Maynard attempted to enlist Trears as a well paid double agent.
And here is where we may be coming to the nub of the difficulties being faced by both the Garda and the Irish authorities in dealing openly and honestly with the families and wounded of the Dublin and Monaghan bombing in 1974. The nature and extent of Garda contact with British Army intelligence will, inevitably, come under scrutiny if and when the Irish Government accede to their demand for a Tribunal of Inquiry. This logically will lead to a crucial question as to whether or not the Garda were acting lawfully and constitutionally in their direct dealings with a foreign army.
Legal advice I have received has lead me to understand that the Garda are entitled to deal directly with a foreign police force but not with a foreign military force. To do so would have to have Government approval, sanctioned at Cabinet level. If the Garda were engaged in cross border contact with British Military Intelligence without Government sanction, they were acting ultra vires. If this is so, there is a serious question as to whether they were acting unlawfully and outside the Constitution of Ireland.
We don't know if these weighty matters are the impediment which are discouraging the Irish Establishment from holding a Tribunal of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings. But it is possible they are. Perhaps the Department of Justice sees this as Ireland's potential 'Appalling Vista'.
Whatever the reason, thirty three innocent people were murdered in Dublin on 17 May 1974. To date, An Garda Siochana and successive Irish Government's have failed to help them find closure to their bereavement through a disturbing lack of public accountability.
We have all admired the brave and historic decision of Prime Minister Blair to re-open the Bloody Sunday Inquiry. The decision to open a Tribunal of Inquiry in this jurisdiction into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings will also require courage, founded on a profound sense of justice, truth and humanity. It will be painful for both the families and the State.
As we approach the 25th anniversary of the greatest mass murder in the history of the Republic, it is appropriate that we recall the words of the present Garda Commissioner, Patrick Byrne, writing in the St. Vincent De Paul publication, "To Act Justly - Reflections of Ireland at the end of the Millennium":
Fiat Justitiae Ruat Coelum.
Let Justice Be Done, Though the Heavens Fall.
History, however, teaches us that the Heavens don't Fall when Justice and Truth are done.
copyright Don Mullan 21 April 1999